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Section Three: Article 12 of the CRC and
New York State Law
by Chantima Chokloikaew275
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of form-
ing his or her own views the right to express those views freely in
all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a repre-
sentative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with
the procedural rules of national law.276
The purpose of this Section is to simulate the CRC reporting
system within the context of New York State law. Part I will set out
CRC’s Article 12 and its relationship to other provisions of the
CRC. Part II will examine relevant provisions of New York State law
that concern the child—education, healthcare, family law, and ju-
venile justice—and make contrasts and draw comparisons between
these laws and the child’s right to participation guaranteed under
Article 12 of the CRC. Part III will conclude that there are ways in
which New York State law could be strengthened in order to be in
compliance with the requirements and intent of Article 12 of the
CRC.
I. ARTICLE 12 OF THE CRC
Article 12 of the CRC sets out the child’s right to involvement
in decision-making when that decision affects the child. It provides
that children have the right to say what they think should happen
and have their opinions taken into account when adults are mak-
ing decisions that affect children.277 This respect for the views of
the child should not, however, be construed as giving children au-
thority over adults or as allowing children to tell their parents what
to do.278 Article 12 does not interfere with parents’ rights and re-
sponsibilities to express their views on matters affecting their chil-
dren.279 Article 12 merely encourages adults to listen to the
275 J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School; B.A., New York University.
276 See CRC, supra note 2, art. 12.
277 See CRC, supra note 2, art. 12.
278 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 145.
279 Id.
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opinions of children and to involve them in the decision-making
process.280
The CRC as a whole regards the child as an active subject of
rights.281 Article 12 of the CRC sets forth the idea that a child is an
individual with fundamental human rights, views and feelings of
her or his own.282 It is a departure from the traditional rights given
to children, that regard children more as an object of the law, or
subjects of the laws that mandate how they are treated.
Traditionally, in most matters affecting children, a child’s
rights are derivative rights, stemming from her or his parents. One
example of how a system of derivative rights can negatively affect a
child is in asylum law, where a child’s refugee status is tied to that
of her or his parent(s), even though the child’s own experiences
may earn that child refugee status on her or his own.283 Under the
CRC, the child would be the active subject of her or his own rights
and could apply for refugee status independently of her or his
parent(s).284
The phrase “due weight in accordance with the age and ma-
turity of the child” in Article 12 of the CRC refers to the evolving
capacities of the child.285 Article 12 stresses the need to “respect
the child’s developing capacity for decision making.”286 There is no
minimum age set by these provisions.287 This means that the only
reason to deprive a child of the right to intervene on her or his
own behalf is when the child is clearly incapable of forming her or
his own views. The due weight provision is about the child’s right
to participate in matters and be heard.288
The evolving capacity principle289 in the CRC serves to distin-
guish between the child’s capacity to form views and the separate
capacity to communicate those views, which are to be taken into
consideration in accordance with age and maturity.290 Article 40 of
the CRC also distinguishes between a child’s capacity to form views
280 Id.
281 Id. at 148.
282 Id.
283 See Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2008).
284 See generally THE GENERAL MEASURES OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD–THE PROCESS IN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 12, UNICEF INNOCENTI RESEARCH
CENTRE, http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/crcmeasures.pdf.
285 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 145.
286 Id.
287 See CRC, supra note 2, art. 12.
288 See id.
289 See generally id. art. 5.
290 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 149.
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versus the ability to communicate those views in reference to juve-
nile justice proceedings, where a child can receive the free assis-
tance of an interpreter “if the child cannot understand or speak
the language used.”291 Obligations under Article 12 cannot be cir-
cumvented by the best interest principle.292 The reference to “pro-
cedural rules of national law” in the Implementation Handbook
suggests that domestic legislation should have express and specific
provisions to allow for implementation of a child’s rights under
Article 12.293 Article 12 also specifically provides for the child’s
right to be heard in judicial and administrative proceedings, such
as court hearings and other formal decision-making that affects the
child. Examples of decision-making that affects a child include ed-
ucation, health, family, juvenile justice, institutionalized place-
ment, and other care.294
A child’s right to be heard is interrelated with Article 19 of the
CRC, which protects a child from violence.295 Under Article 19,
effective complaint procedures are an essential element of child
protection, especially in family, school, and alternative care envi-
ronments.296 In the context of child protection, which overlaps
with family life, Article 12 requires the establishment of procedures
for the child to complain and report independent of his or her
parents.297 This independence is also required for health services
as it relates to child protection—for example, an unwanted preg-
nancy resulting from incest or abuse.298
Articles 3 and 12 of the CRC are also related to a child’s right
to be heard. Article 3 recognizes a child as an individual, and re-
quires protection of children as a group by ensuring that their best
interest is a “primary consideration” in any decision-making pro-
cess.299 Article 12 serves as a subset of Article 3 by looking at each
child on an individual level and calling for participation from the
child in decision-making when appropriate. Article 12 then calls
for States Parties to give due consideration to the views and opin-
ions of the child when determining a course of action to be
291 See CRC, supra note 2, art. 40(2)(b)(vi).
292 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 149.
293 Id. at 151 (citing OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., MAN-
UAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 429 (1997)).
294 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 145.
295 CRC, supra note 2, art. 19.
296 See UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 157.
297 See id.
298 See id.
299 CRC, supra note 2, art. 3.
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taken.300
II. RELEVANT NEW YORK STATE LAWS REGARDING A CHILD’S INPUT
A. Education
The Committee recognizes that legal frameworks alone will
not achieve the necessary attitudes and practices within families,
schools, or communities to incorporate a child’s input. To improve
child participation in decision-making, the Committee has en-
couraged a variety of strategies for implementing Article 12, in-
cluding, in particular, in educational settings.301 One suggestion
includes incorporating principles of the CRC within the school cur-
riculum.302 For example, a school could establish mechanisms for
children to experience and enhance their capacity for participa-
tion by intervening in school councils regarding matters relating to
their education.303
The New York Education Law provides for a child’s participa-
tion in matters relating to their education on an individual basis
and only under certain circumstances.304 The Education Law rec-
ognizes a child, until the age of twenty-one, as an individual in its
provisions relating to education of children with handicapping
conditions305 and children in child care institutions.306 Children in
child care institutions who have not yet graduated from high
school are entitled to a “free and appropriate education in the
least restrictive environment for that child,”307 and the program
offered is determined by the needs of the individual child.308 In the
section regarding children with handicapping conditions, the law
calls for special education committees to meet, evaluate, choose
appropriate support systems, and appropriately place the child in
an educational setting based on the child’s individual strengths,
weaknesses, and needs.309 The emphasis on individuality is seen
even in the education plan resulting from the special education
meetings, called Individualized Education Plans (“IEPs”).310 Addi-
300 Id. art.12.
301 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 153.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402 (McKinney 2006).
305 Id. The term “handicapping condition” is used in Article 89 of the New York
Education Law to refer to a student with a disability. See id. art. 89, §§ 4401–4410-b.
306 Id.
307 Id. § 4002(1).
308 Id. § 4002(2).
309 Id.
310 Id. § 4002.
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tionally, section 4402 of the New York Education Law provides for
the minimum member composition requirements of a special edu-
cation committee, which include parents, various special education
school officials, and, “if appropriate, the student.”311
While the Education Law’s express requirement that the
child’s participation be taken into consideration is in line with the
principles of Article 12 of the CRC, New York law does not com-
port fully with the requirements of Article 12. First, there is no ex-
press provision for the views of the child to be considered.312 Even
in the provision that sets forth the mandatory members of the spe-
cial education committee, the student’s participation in developing
an IEP is only required “if appropriate,” which effectively makes
the student’s presence optional and no longer mandatory.313 It is
unclear who gets to decide on the appropriateness of a child’s pres-
ence at a special education committee meeting and, in practice,
most students do not attend the meetings despite their age, matur-
ity, and capacity to understand and express their views due to the
discomfort of being surrounded by authority figures. Even when
the child is present, there is no mention of any consideration or
weight to be given to the child’s views. There should be the express
mention of and an alternative method to ascertaining the child’s
views so that the child may express her or his views freely. Possible
methods include having the child write out her or his preferences
before the meeting, or soliciting the child’s input in a less intimi-
dating setting, such as in a one-on-one discussion with a trusted
member of the special education committee.
Outside the realm of special education, New York’s Education
Law glaringly omits any reference to a child’s opinions, and cer-
tainly does not ensure a child the right to freely express them. This
lack of promotion of participation of the child as an individual or
as a member of children as a group in a major part of their life and
development is not in line with the principles set forth in Article
12.
B. Healthcare
The CRC upholds a child’s right to participate in decisions
concerning their health and health care.314 The CRC does not sup-
311 Id. § 4402 (1)(b)(1)(a).
312 See id. § 4002.
313 See id.
314 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 162; see also CRC, supra
note 276, arts. 1, 24.
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port the setting of a minimum age for participation, but rather re-
quires respect for the “evolving capacities” of the child to make
decisions for her or himself.315 A child’s opinion is required “both
in relation to the overall planning, delivery and monitoring of
health services . . . and also in relation to the treatment of the
individual child, and the child’s right to consent or refuse consent
to treatment.”316
The general rule in New York State is that only a person over
the age of eighteen years old may consent to medical care on her
or his own behalf.317 However, New York law does not set a mini-
mum age of consent for medical, dental, health, and hospital ser-
vices for any person who is pregnant and seeking prenatal care.318
By virtue of becoming a parent, the young person is emancipated
from having to seek consent for medical treatment, and has auton-
omy over medical decisions involving the pregnancy.319 Further-
more, while the general rule is that only a person over age
eighteen may consent to medical care on her or his own behalf,320
New York carves out an exception which allows services to be ren-
dered to “persons of any age without the consent of parent or legal
guardian” when there exists an emergency requiring “immediate
attention and an attempt to secure consent would delay treatment
and increase risk to . . . life and health.”321
A less extreme example of health taking precedent over age-
related procedure concerns prison inmates. An inmate who is
under eighteen and for whom no medical consent was obtained
prior to commitment or transfer is granted the capacity “to consent
to routine medical, dental, and mental health services and treat-
ment.”322 Subdivision 3 of this statute allows for the inmate’s par-
ent or legal guardian to institute legal proceedings to deny
provision of said services at any time before the inmate turns eigh-
teen.323 The effect of this subdivision is to take away the minor in-
mate’s capacity to consent originally and, as such, seems
inconsistent with the practice of taking the views of the child into
consideration in matters affecting the child. Moreover, while these
315 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 323.
316 Id.
317 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 2006).
318 Id. § 2504(3).
319 Id.
320 Id. § 2504(1).
321 Id. § 2504(4).
322 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 140 (McKinney 2006).
323 Id. § 140(3)(a).
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provisions for a minor to consent may satisfy the obligations of Arti-
cle 12, they are an extremely limited exception to a general rule
requiring the consent of a parent or other legal guardian in mat-
ters of a child’s healthcare.
In order to honor the obligations set forth in Article 12 of the
CRC and to recognize the child as an active subject within the law,
no minimum age should be required to maintain the evolving ca-
pacities principle that the child acquires the right to make deci-
sions once he or she is considered to have “sufficient
understanding.”324 In the alternative, New York should enact a pro-
vision requiring parents and healthcare providers to confer with
and take into consideration the child’s views in accordance with
the child’s age and maturity in all healthcare decisions.
C. Family Law
Article 20 of the CRC concerns children deprived of their fam-
ily environment and entitles the child to special protection and as-
sistance provided by a State Party.325 The CRC stresses the
importance of protecting the child’s right to participation in all
such settings.326
Under its findings and purpose section, the New York Family
Court Act declares that minors who are “the subject of family court
proceedings or appeals in proceedings originating in the family
court should be represented by counsel of their own choosing or
by law guardians.”327 This declaration is based on the idea that “mi-
nors . . . often require the assistance of counsel to help protect
their interests and to help them express their wishes to the
court.”328
One area where New York law and the CRC are fully aligned is
New York’s permanency hearing regulations, which provide that
the family court consider the child’s input regarding her or his
permanency plan.329 This accords with a federal statutory require-
ment to consult with the child in an age-appropriate manner.330
New York’s requirement that the child is consulted with in an age-
appropriate manner accords with the elements of Article 12 that
require consideration of the child’s participation and evolving ca-
324 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 162.
325 CRC, supra note 2, art. 20.
326 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 158.
327 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 2006).
328 Id.
329 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.17(e) (2007).
330 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(iii) (2008).
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pacities.331 Courts have not interpreted “consult” to require posing
a literal question to the child.332 This reflects a similar understand-
ing contained in the CRC.333 Rather, the statutory requirement of
the “age-appropriate” standard recognizes the evolving capacity of
a child, but contains no mention of whether due weight is to be
given in accordance with the child’s age and maturity. Nonethe-
less, this is a step in the right direction, as a child should be able to
express his or her view without coercion or constraint.334 The per-
manency hearing regulations mandate that the court ascertain the
child’s views, meaning that they allow for the child’s presence in
court, as the child may be required to answer questions should the
court determined that it does not know the child’s position.335
This, then, would not be in keeping with the CRC, as the child is
no longer viewed as an active subject but rather as an object of the
law.
The New York Family Court Act acknowledges a child’s right
to “signify assent” to visitation with or custody of their parent or
guardian where otherwise the parent or guardian would not be al-
lowed to enforce a visitation or custody order because they were
convicted of murder of a close relative of the child, such as the
other parent, guardian, or sibling.336 This provision not only pro-
vides the child with an opportunity to be heard, but effectively
gives the child the ultimate authority on the matter. This surpasses
the goals and principles of Article 12.
However, one concern in the New York Family Court Act is the
language regarding the child’s age. The statute covers a child of
“suitable age,” but does not define the phrase.337 Again, as in the
Education Law’s use of the term “if appropriate” to describe a
child’s participation in a special education committee meeting,338
the question here becomes who decides the “suitable age” of a
child. This leaves open the possibility of ad hoc court decisions re-
garding the suitability of the child’s age. A more optimistic inter-
pretation can arguably view that this “suitable age” reservation
331 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(iii) (2008).
332 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES’ ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL § 8.3C.2c [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE POLICY
MANUAL].
333 See CRC, supra note 2, art. 12; UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note
89, at 149.
334 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 149.
335 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 205.17(e).
336 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1085.
337 Id.
338 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402 (1)(b)(1)(a), discussed in Part II.A of this article.
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takes into account the evolving capacities of the child and allows
the child to freely express her or his views. Assuming it is a valid
interpretation, there is still an inherent minimum age, as it is
doubtful that a court would find a three-year old to be of “suitable
age” to assent to such a matter. The tone of the family law provi-
sions seems to be one of “best interest of the child,” which in prac-
tice potentially means that the child has no say or real opportunity
to participate. This is further evidenced by the law providing for
the placement of the child “in the custody of a relative or other
suitable person . . . or [in the custody] of the local commissioner of
social services or of such other officer, board or department as may
be authorized to receive children as public charges, or a duly au-
thorized association, agency, society or in an institution suitable for
the placement of a child.”339
This section of the Family Court Act makes no mention of
child participation in the placement decision, and states simply
that “the court may place the child.”340 The child only has the right
to consent to or deny a placement to be made or continued after
his or her eighteenth birthday.341 Since childhood under the CRC
ends at age eighteen, this statute does not provide for the child’s
voice to be heard or considered in proceedings affecting where
they will live until they have attained the age of majority.342 The
same is true of the provision regarding disposition of adjudication
of permanent neglect.343
Most of the laws in the Family Court Act view each child as an
individual, but not necessarily as an individual with the right to be
heard. Rather, much of the Family Court Act views each child as an
individual having a unique set of personal circumstances that are
to be addressed by the court, not as an individual with her or his
own views which merit consideration. Thus, the Family Court Act’s
interpretation of a child’s individuality does not meet the goals and
requirements of Article 12 of the CRC.
D. Juvenile Justice
The Committee has interpreted Article 12 of the CRC as re-
quiring complaint procedures to be made available to children,
and has stressed the need for setting in place complaint proce-
339 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1055(a).
340 Id.
341 Id. § 1055(e).
342 Id.
343 Id. § 631.
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dures in situations where a child’s liberty is restricted.344 The view
of the Committee is that “access to effective complaint procedures
is an essential element of child protection,”345 especially to protect
children from maltreatment in institutions such as juvenile
facilities.346
In New York, a “juvenile delinquent”347 put under arrest has
no more rights regarding “respect for their views” than an adult,
except that a child may be appointed a law guardian instead of an
attorney.348 There are no provisions for the child’s right to express
views in a juvenile justice proceeding.349 A child’s age is taken into
consideration only as one factor in determining the suitability of
questioning and determining the reasonable period of time for
questioning.350
New York law does provide for some internal facility oversight
for children in State custody.351 According to New York State regu-
lations, there must exist within the New York State Office of Chil-
dren and Family Services (“OCFS”) an Office of the Ombudsman
staffed by attorneys.352 The ombudsmen are entitled to visit facili-
ties, hear children’s grievances, investigate alleged violations, and
otherwise represent the rights of incarcerated children vis-a`-vis
OCFS.353 However, a 2006 Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) report
reveals shortcoming in the implementation of such provisional
safeguards.354 In its examination of grievance reporting, HRW
found a serious lack of accountability, oversight, and transparency
in OCFS facilities.355 There were reports of girls attempting to ad-
dress complaints to the OCFS ombudsman but receiving no re-
344 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 503; see also CRC, supra
note 276, art. 37.
345 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 157.
346 See generally id. at 155.
347 “‘Juvenile delinquent’ means a person over seven and less than sixteen years of
age, who, having committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult, (a) is not criminally responsible for such conduct by reason of infancy, or (b) is
the defendant in an action ordered removed from a criminal court to the family court
pursuant to article seven hundred twenty-five of the criminal procedure law.” N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1).
348 Id. § 320.3.
349 See id. § 343.1.
350 Id. § 301(8).
351 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 523-c (setting out the duties of the office of the ombudsman).
352 Id. § 523.
353 Id. § 523-c.
354 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CUSTODY AND CON-
TROL: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK’S JUVENILE PRISONS FOR GIRLS, http:/
/www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0906webwcover.pdf.
355 Id. at 121–28.
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sponse.356 Other girls were not put in contact with the
ombudsman, or were told explicitly that they could not speak to
the ombudsman.357
Interestingly, developments in juvenile justice are beginning
to collectively take into consideration children’s voices in matters
affecting other children. Programs in recent years have given
young people an opportunity to participate in the government,
thereby educating and involving the students in their communities
and matters that affect them. These include youth courts and the
Youth Justice Board.358 There are nearly one hundred active youth
courts across New York State.359 The teenage members of youth
courts learn about the justice system, and, acting as judge, jury, and
advocate, hear real cases that are referred by courts, police pre-
cincts, and schools involving truancy, vandalism, and assault.360
The goals of youth courts are to promote community restitution
and engagement by the child who committed the harm.361
The Youth Justice Board is specific to New York City and fos-
ters participation in government in another way. It is an after-
school program bringing together fifteen to twenty teenagers from
different New York City schools to “devise recommendations on
justice system issues that affect youth, such as school safety, juvenile
offenders returning to New York City following placement in a
state facility, and the permanency planning process.”362 The pro-
gram engages the participants in a dialogue with policymakers. For
example, one presentation in 2007 concerned ideas for improving
New York City’s permanency planning process with the goal of
helping “foster care youth participate in their court cases so that
the process could better meet their needs.”363 The members of the
Youth Justice Board conducted interviews, observed court, and
held focus groups with youth in foster care system. Their research
culminated in a report presented to key stakeholders in New York
City’s child protection system.364 The Youth Justice Board spent the
remainder of the year working with stakeholders in the perma-
nency planning process to implement some of the Board’s
356 Id. at 122.
357 Id.
358 Jacqueline Sherman & Dory Hack, Preparing Young Citizens for Democracy, N.Y. ST.
BAR ASSOC. J., Jan. 2008, at 24.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 25.
363 Id. at 26.
364 Sherman & Hack, supra note 358, at 26.
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recommendations.365
Although they are not in the scope of New York’s statutory
provisions, programs such as the Youth Justice Board are fully in
keeping with the aims of Article 12, and of the CRC as a whole.
Despite the fact that these programs do not involve individual child
participation in matters concerning them, they do involve the voice
of children as a whole, which urges the governing bodies to view
each child as an active subject of rights. This effective implementa-
tion of experimental programs based on aspiration rather than law
is a positive counterbalance to the pattern we have seen of aspira-
tional statutes lacking effective implementation.
Article 12 underlines the idea of the child as an active subject
and bearer of her or his own rights. Previous human rights docu-
ments channeled the right of the child through the parents. For
example, under New York’s Human Rights law—which provides
New Yorkers protections against discrimination—the definition of
familial status for anti-discrimination measures confers protections
through the parent’s status and not on the basis of the child’s own
individuality.366
Article 12 of the CRC reinforces the idea of a child’s evolving
capacities in the phrases “capable of forming his or her own
views”367 and “due weight in accordance with the age and maturity
of the child.”368 These phrases have been interpreted as ensuring
that the child’s views are respected even in situations where the
child may be able to form views but not able to communicate
them.369 However, despite these positive trends, there is still need
for much reform. Children’s issues do not simply affect children.
More than affecting families, children’s rights and issues affect
communities now and in the future. In other countries, youth par-
liaments370 enable children to meet once a year to discuss current
legislation, and offer opportunities for children to be involved in
the legislative decision-making process. New York’s counterpart to
this is the Youth Justice Board.371 If the CRC were closely followed
in New York, youth participation in legislation and government
365 Id.
366 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (26); § 296 (2-a); (3-b); (5).
367 CRC, supra note 2, art. 12(1).
368 Id.
369 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 149.
370 See, e.g., U.K. Youth Parliament, http://www.ukyouthparliament.org.uk/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2010); Scottish Youth Parliament, http://www.syp.org.uk/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2010); Youth Parliament Pakistan, http://www.pildat.org/youthparliament/
YP2008/AboutYPP.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
371 See Sherman & Hack, supra note 358, at 24.
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would not be limited to after-school programs such as the Youth
Justice Board. The CRC advises that a coordinating body be re-
sponsible for overseeing group participation as well as individual
child participation in decision-making. This is just one of the many
ways in which New York could do more to benefit children, their
families, and communities.
Section Four: The Availability of Preventative
Rehabilitation Services for Children Engaged in
Prostitution; CRC Article 34 and its
Optional Protocol
by Jeremy A. Cooney372
“Trafficking and exploitation plague all nations, and no country,
even ours, is immune.”373
The numbers of trafficked children are staggering. The fed-
eral State Department estimates that each year approximately
400,000 children are trafficked across international borders as sex-
ual commodities.374 Alarmingly, while the number of trafficked
children is progressively increasing, the age of entry into prostitu-
tion is steadily decreasing. The average age of girls who enter into
the sex trade is between twelve and fourteen years old, while for
boys and transgender youth it is between the ages of eleven and
thirteen years old.375 As a result, there has been an international
response to this “modern form of slavery”376 and to help combat
commercial sexual exploitation of children.
Significant disparities exist between the international child
rights movement and the laws of the United States with respect to
formulating a meaningful response to protecting children from ex-
ploitation. Despite growing pressure from the global community,
372 J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School, 2010; B.A., Hobart College, 2004.
373  Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Former U.S. Secretary of State, in TRAFFICKING
IN PERSONS REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/
2008/105375.htm.
374  Id. at 23.
375 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Child Prostitu-
tion, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/prostitution.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2010).
376 Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Prostitution: A Modern Form of Slavery, in MAKING THE
HARM VISIBLE: GLOBAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS: SPEAKING OUT
AND PROVIDING SERVICES (Donna M. Hughes & Claire M. Roche, eds., 1999), available
at http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/mhvslave.htm.
